
CRASH PUTS
SPOTLIGHT ON CONTRACTS
MAINTENANCE LINK FOR
FLIGHT 5481 SCRUTINIZED
Sunday, March 16, 2003
TED REED, AMES ALEXANDER and CHARLES LUNAN, STAFF WRITERS,
STAFF WRITER ADAM BELL CONTRIBUTED TO THIS ARTICLE.
Loaded by one
company, flown by another and maintained by a third that hired from a
fourth, US Airways Express Flight 5481 was a testament to the increasingly
common practice of jobbing out work in the airline industry. But its Jan. 8
crash at Charlotte/Douglas International Airport, which killed 21 people,
has raised new questions about whether third-party maintenance is always a
reliable method for assuring airline safety.
The National
Transportation Safety Board, which is investigating the crash, will "most
certainly" look at the uncommon arrangement under which Flight 5481 was
maintained, said a source familiar with the investigation. Air Midwest flew
the plane for US Airways and, under federal regulations, was responsible for
maintenance. But, it's unclear how closely Air Midwest was able to monitor
maintenance work done on the plane by other companies.
A key question
is whether the sequence of events that preceded the crash would have
happened at a more traditional airline maintenance hangar, where the
airline's permanent mechanics have their work overseen by a safety inspector
with fewer additional responsibilities.
The NTSB has
said the flight control cables on the Beech 1900 were improperly adjusted
two days before the crash, which happened 37 seconds after takeoff.
The Charlotte
flight marked the first time the plane was fully loaded following the
adjustment, sources said. A full load would have meant that~ the pilots
required more response from the flight control system.
The work was
performed in a small hangar at Tri-State Airport in Huntington, W.Va., where
Air Midwest contracted with Raytheon Aerospace LLC to maintain its planes,
and where Raytheon used an Edgewater, Fla., employment contractor called
Structural, Modification and Repair Technicians Inc., or SMART, to provide
staff. The shop had been open for six months and employed about a dozen
people.
The management
structure is unusual because the Federal Aviation Administration, which
oversees airline safety, allowed the hangar to operate under Air Midwest's
certificate, but other companies provided all but one of the workers.
Air Midwest
declined to comment on issues related to the NTSB investigation. Spokesmen
for Raytheon and SMART have repeatedly declined to comment.
The mechanic
who adjusted the flight-control cables on the Beech 1900 turboprop was doing
the job on that type of airplane for the first time, sources said. He
expected an inspection by his supervisor, who - like the mechanic - was
hired through SMART, a source said. Whether the inspection ever occurred is
part of the investigation.
"(The mechanic)
was told to do the job," the source said. "The inspector/supervisor told him
some steps to follow and said he would watch him. But that guy was busy,
inspecting and managing (and) trying to hold the operation together."
At bigger
maintenance bases, including some third-party shops, there is typically more
support for a mechanic, including inspectors, more supervisors and
experienced co-workers.
"If I was
working on something that was new for me, they always put me with someone
who had done it before," said Joe Turner, a longtime US Airways mechanic who
worked in Charlotte and retired in 1999.
At the least,
the FAA should require that airlines retain the role of inspector when they
contract out for maintenance, said Jim Burnett, chairman of the NTSB from
1982 to 1988.
"The FAA should
say it's the responsibility of the airline, and not allow them to delegate
that to anyone," Burnett said. "That's one thing that would prevent them
from being a virtual airline."
The FAA visited
the Huntington site several times before the crash, said spokesman Les Dorr.
The site meets FAA standards, he said. Air Midwest is responsible for the
work that goes on there because the repair station operates under its
certificate, he said.
Typically, the
FAA relies on the airlines to oversee employees at their maintenance shops,
to make sure proper training is provided, adequate support is in place for
employees doing a job for the first time and airline maintenance procedures
are followed.
But the
standards don't specifically address the situation at Huntington. Rules that
were written to apply to airlines performing maintenance at their own
maintenance bases, possibly with some mechanics provided by temporary
agencies, are being applied at a hangar where the airline's presence is
extremely limited.
"There's
nothing in the rule book that deals with this growing situation of contract
workers," said Bart Crotty, an aviation maintenance and safety consultant in
Springfield, Va. "There's no regulation that speaks to that word 'contract
worker.' He's considered as part of the main organization, and the
organization is (assumed) to know about their own employees."
Crotty said
it's unusual for an airline to operate a maintenance base under its own
certificate with the vast majority of workers provided by a contract agency,
but there are no statistics that show how rare it is.
When the NTSB
reviews the contractual arrangements in Huntington, it won't be the first
time jobbing out emerged as an issue in a fatal airplane crash. The 1996
crash of a ValuJet plane in the Everglades, which killed 110 people, was
blamed primarily on mechanics, supplied by a contractor, who improperly
loaded oxygen canisters onto the plane. The canisters later exploded.
ValuJet came to
be referred to as a "virtual airline" because it had jobbed out work
traditionally done by airlines.
In response,
the FAA developed a strategy for better managing virtual airlines by
providing increased oversight of maintenance contractors.
Still, ValuJet
sold tickets, loaded baggage at some airports, flew under its own name and
used its own mechanics for line maintenance. Air Midwest, the operator of
Flight 5481, filled none of those roles, partially because its contract with
US Airways prevented it from selling tickets or loading bags. The relentless
cost pressures of the airline industry have forced it and many other
carriers to seek more efficient models for doing business.
At least four
companies were responsible for operating, maintaining and loading Flight
5481. One was Air Midwest. Two other companies were involved in maintenance.
A fourth company, US Airways, sold the tickets for the flight, which
operated as US Airways Express. Piedmont Aviation, a US Airways sister
company, loaded the plane.
Third-party
maintenance companies now do about half of all maintenance work for U.S.
airlines. In 2001, major carriers spent $2.9 billion for outsourced aircraft
maintenance - $1.3 billion more than they spent five years earlier,
according to the U.S. Department of Transportation inspector general.
Located
worldwide, these repair stations range from three-person shops that fix
radios to stations with thousands of workers who rebuild entire airframes.
Contracting out
can enable airlines to sidestep costly union contracts. Critics say
mechanics at small third-party shops tend to have less training, less
experience and less oversight from the FAA than mechanics employed directly
by airlines.
Still, the U.S.
aviation community continues to maintain one of the world's safest
transportation systems. Crash rates have declined since the 1980s, along
with the percentage of accidents related to maintenance problems. Modern
commercial planes come with multiple safety backups, and are more reliable
than ever. Airlines that farm out maintenance say they ensure the work is
done to their high standards.
Whether the
industry's financial crisis has affected the quality of maintenance is
unclear. Two major airlines, United and US Airways, are operating under
bankruptcy court protection while American, the largest airline, is
considering a bankruptcy filing.
Industry
officials insist they can't afford to skimp on safety. But some FAA
inspectors and experts worry that financial pressures are eroding the safety
cushion. They point to studies showing a correlation between the
profitability and safety of airlines.
And some
experts say it has become tougher for airlines to ensure maintenance work is
done to their standards when the mechanics are contractually so far removed.
"The more
removed you get from the maintenance, the more training it takes," says
Sarah MacLeod, executive director of the Aeronautical Repair Station
Association, a group that represents repair shops. "The more tiers, the
closer you'd better be looking."
The DOT
inspector general's office is now examining the FAA's oversight of third
party repair stations. In testimony before Congress last month, DOT
Inspector General Ken Mead warned that the FAA must pay attention to the
shift in maintenance practices.
"In the current
financially strapped aviation environment, FAA must remain vigilant in its
oversight," he said. "A word of caution: FAA needs to pay close attention to
the level of oversight it provides for repair stations."
Linda Goodrich,
a maintenance inspector who now helps run a union that represents FAA
inspectors, said third party relationships are still low on the agency's
priority list. "If 10 percent of our time is devoted to these third party
facilities, that would be saying something," she said.

Who's Flying the Plane?
The U.S.
Department of Transportation requires that airlines make it clear what
company flies planes that operate under the airline's name. US Airways, for
instance, must inform passengers what company is flying US Airways Express
flights. It does so in several places, including: